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prevalent in our day. However, the decisions reveal that definite
guidance for the application of the doctrine is sadly wanting.
The courts are generally in agreement on the importance that the
origination of criminal intent is with the defendant, but there is
little certainty as to whether the criminal record of the accused
can be used in determining reasonable cause.
Extreme positions have been taken in regard to the defense.
Tennessee has rejected the defense completely.40 Colorado has
held that authorities who entrap suspected violators can be con41
victed of conspiracy.
It appears to the writer that the most realistic approach is that of
Mr. Justice Roberts, as espoused in the concurring opinion of
Sorrells. Acceptance of this view, which is not law today, would
limit consideration of conduct solely to that of the police and thus
give impetus to what the writer feels, is the true meaning of entrapment; it would allow court determination of the issue as a
question of law, and Would not depend upon a defendant's record
for conviction on a particular charge. Travel on the road to certainty must be made in the field and this view would provide at
least a suitable road map.
WILLIAM A. STRTZ
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NORTH DAKOTA'S
FEDERALIZED STATE INCOME TAX
INTRODUCTION
"Federalization" of state income tax law means that the provisions of the state law are made to conform, to a greater or lesser
degree, to the provisions of the federal Internal Revenue Code
of 1954.' The need for this conformity is but one facet of the
40. Thomas v. State, 182 Tenn. 380, 187 S.W.2d 529 (1945); Goins v. State, 192
Tenn. 32, 237 S.W.2d 8 (1951).
41. Reigan v. People, 120 Colo. 472, 210 P.2d 991 (1949).
1. Generally, see Brabner-Smith, Incorporationby Reference and Delegation of PowerValidity of "Reference" Legislation, 5 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 198 (1937); Kanter, A Critique
of Some Federal, State, and Local Tax Coordination Techniques, 29 Ind. L.J. 28 (1953);
King, State Constitutions ForbiddingIncorporationby Reference, 16 B.U.L. Rev. 625 (1936);
Lockyer, Kentucky Income Tax Compared With Federal Income Tax, 42 Ky. L.J. 368
(1954); Lockyer, History of the Kentucky Income Tax, 43 Ky. L.J. 457 (1955); Mermin,
"Cooperative Federalism" Again: State and Municipal Legislation Penalizing Violation of
Existing and Future Federal Requirements: I, 57 Yale L.J. 1, 19 (1947); J. Miller, The
New Iowa Income Tax Law, 41 Iowa L. Rev. 85 (1955); P. Miller, Proposal for a Federally-Based New York Personal Income Tax, 13 Tax L. Rev. 183 (1958); Read, Is Referential Legislation Worth While?, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 261 (1941); Notes, 3 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 482 (1935), 17 Montana L. Rev. 203 (1956); Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 797 (1955);
Annot., 166 A.L.R. 516 (1947); Address by Kenneth M. Jakes, Spec. Assistant Attorney
Gen. for the N. Dak. State Tax Comm'r's Office, 1958 convention of the N. Dak. Soc'y
of CPA's, October 4, 1958.
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whole problem of uncoordinated taxation which faces today's taxpayer. He is taxed at a multitude of governmental levels and may
be subject to income taxes levied by the federal government, two
or more states,2 and his municipal government.3 Any substantial
relief afforded him in ascertaining his tax liabilities is, it would
seem, well worth any reasonable compromises found necessary.
I.

FEDERALIZATION TECHNIQUES
ACTION IN OTHER STATES
The idea of federalization of state taxes, income and other, has
found expression in the statutes of least twenty-six states4 (besides
North Dakota), Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and Alaska,
when that state was still a territory. Federalization has taken many
different forms, ranging from complete adoption of federal law
by reference thereto, to the adoption, by whole statutes containing no reference to federal law, of one or more isolated portions
of the IRC.5 Kentucky,6 Montana,7 and Iowa 8 have statutes similar to Senate Bill 186, infra (which bill was modeled on the Iowa
9
statute).
ACTION IN NORTH DAKOTA
Senate Bill No. 186, introduced this year (1959) to the ThirtySixth Legislative Assembly of North Dakota,"° is a federalization
proposal." The provisions of this bill here pertinent are:
Section 1. "Taxable income", with respect to fiduciaries, estates,
2. See N.D. Rev. Code § 57-3804 (1943).
3. See N.D.H.R. 837, 36th Legislative Assembly (1959).
4. Ariz., Cal., Colo., Conn., Del., Ga., Idaho, Iowa, Kan., Ky., La., Md., Mass.,
Minn., Mont., N.J., N.Y., Okla., Ore., Pa., R.I., Tenn., Utah, Vt., Va., and Wis.
5. See, e.g., Alaska Comp. Laws § 248-10-5 (Supp. 1953); Colo. Rev. Stat. §
138-1-62(2) (1953); Ga. Code Ann. § 9 -3109(a) (Supp. 1958) [Compare with Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a).]; N.Y. Laws 1917 c. 726 as amended by N.Y. Laws 1918
c. 276 [N.Y. Consol. Laws Svc.,.Tax Law, art. 9-A, § 209 (1952), the present New York
statute, is similar. In People ex rel. Barcalo Mfg. Co. v. Knapp, 227 N.Y. 64, 124 N.E. 107
(1919), the application and construction of the 1917 statute was litigated. Article 3, § 16
of the New York constitution, infra, was not discussed.]; Pa. Stat. §§ 3420b-20c (1935).
6. Baldwin's Ky. Rev. Stat. § 141.010 (Supp. 1958). The constitutionality of a similar
statute, passed in 1936, does not seem to have been litigated Re its construction and
application, see, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel.Allphin v. Borders, 267 S.W.2d 940 (Ky.
1954); Churchill Downs-Latonia, Inc. v. Reeves, 297 Ky. 835, 181 S.W.2d 398 (1944).
7. Mont. Rev. Code §§ 84-4905-06 (Replacement Vol. 1955).
8. Iowa Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 422.4, 422.7, 422.9, 422.12, 422.32, 422.33, 422.35
(Supp. 1958).
9. 34 N. Dak. L. Rev. 388 (1958).
10. Senate ]Jill 186 was passed in the N. Dak. Senate [N.D.S. Jour., 36th Legislative
Assembly 391 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1959)]. It was then passed in the N. Dak. House of
R oresentatives [N.D.H.R. Jour., 36th Legislative Assembly 841 (daily ed. Feb. 25,
1959)]. No official information is available at the time of writing on the action taken by
the Governor. It is to be assumed that he has signed the bill into law.
11. The North Dakota State Bar Association has been interested in the federalization
of North Dakota's income tax law since 1956 at least. At its 1958 meeting, the Association
directed its Committee on Tax Laws to draft a federalization bill and have* it presented
to the 1959 session of the Legislative Assembly. See 34 N. Dak. L. Rev. 397 (1958).
For the report of the Committee and a discussion by the Association, see id. at 342 and 387.
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and trusts, is defined as "the taxable income as computed for
federal income tax purposes under the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended .... ."
Section 5. For individuals, "the phrase, 'net income' means the
adjusted gross income as computed for federal income tax purposes
under the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended, with adjustments."
Section 7. Deductions for individuals are " . . . the larger of the
amounts defined as follows: (a five per cent optional standard
deduction, or) the total of contributions, interest, taxes, medical
expenses, child care expense, losses and miscellaneous expenses
deductible for federal income tax purposes under the United States
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended" with adjustments.
Where a couple files a joint federal return and separate state returns, the deduction of federal taxes paid " ...
shall be divided
between them according to law."
The general effect of this bill is that to determine his state income
tax liability, the individual starts with the adjusted gross income
on his federal return. He makes the adjustments specified in the
bill and arrives at his state net income. From this figure he subtracts the optional standard deduction or the total of his itemized
federal deductions after making the specified adjustments thereto.
The resulting figure is his state taxable income, to which he applies
the state rates1 2 to determine the tax payable.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY
NORTH DAKOTA LAW
Article II, section 64 of the Constitution of North Dakota (hereafter referred to as "section 64") reads, "No bill shall be revised
or amended nor the provisions thereof extended or incorporated
in any other bill by reference to its title only, but so much thereof
as is revised, amended or extended or so incorporated shall be
re-enacted and published at length." 3 The constitutionality of
Senate Bill 186 under this provision is the sole question considered
here. 4
The North Dakota decisions on section 64 are few and none are
12. )N.D. Rev. Code § 57-3829 (Supp. 1957).
13. It is of practical interest that § 89 of the N.D. Const. reads in part, ".i..
n
no case shall any legislative enactment or law of the state of North Dakota be declared
unconstitutional unless at least four of the judges [of the Supreme Court] shall so decide."
14. Two collateral questions not considered are whether there is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power and whether Senate Bill 186 works an adoption of federal
administrative rulings. Re the former, the courts have generally answered "no". Re the
latter, see 34 N. Dak. L. Rev. 391 (1958).
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squarely in point. A s*tatute complete in itself,15 which does not
depend upon other statutes for the complete expression of the
legislative purpose1 6 is not in conflict with section 64 even though
it modifies or amends other statutes by implication. In Department
of State Highways v. Baker" the act in question, which referred
to a prior act for certain definitions was held valid, the court
stating that section 64 ". . . was not intended to require the reenactment and publication at length of all definitions which might
be employed in the construction of the law . . . ."Is The court
also had before it the question of the validity of incorporation by
reference of both procedural and substantive provisions of a prior
statute., The court did not decide these questions in terms of section
64. In its discussion, however, it implied that it would accept
such an incorporation of procedural provisions but would reject an
incorporation by reference of prior substantive law, stating at one
point that section 64 ". . . was not intended to require the reenactment and publication at length of ... all details of procedure
which might be required in carrying out the essential purpose.""
In considering these decisions and those which follow, an understanding of the meaning of the key words in section 64, i.e.,
"revise , "amend", "extend" and "incorporate", is essential. The
first three of these deal with the effect of the act in question on
the prior act. "Incorporate", on the other hand, deals with the
effect of the prior act on the act in question, in that the incorporation of a prior act has the effect of making its provisions an
operative part of the act in question. It is not possible to extend
the provisions of a prior act without, in one sense at least, amending the prior act. 21 In dealing with references to foreign law (as
opposed to prior statutes of the forum) it must be remembered that
no amendment or revision is possible. The power of the legislature
in this situation is limited to the extension or incorporation of the
foreign law.
It might be argued that section 64 is not applicable to anything
but acts of the North Dakota Legislature (as opposed to federal
or other-state legislation) where incorporation or extension by
reference is concerned. Observe that an abridged version would
read, "No bill . . . nor the provisions thereof (shall be) extended
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

State v. Fargo Bottling Works Co., 19 N.D. 396, 124 N.W. 387 (1910).
State ex rel. Gammons v. Shafer, 63 'N.D. 128, 246 N.W. 874 (1933).
69 N.D. 702, 290 N.W. 257 (1940).
Id. at 264.
Ibid.
Read, supra, note 1 at 280.
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or incorporated in any other bill by reference .... ." (Emphasis
added.) The same might be said of the provisions of many other
states. This precise question has not been litigated in North Dakota, but the other jurisdictions have not made a distinction be21
tween foreign and domestic law in this connection.
The above analyses might be criticized as semantically shallow
in that the real question is the intent of the framers of section
64. Unfortunately, neither the Journal of the North Dakota Constitutional Convention nor the Debates of the North Dakota Constitutional Convention22 reveal anything of their intent. The only
2 3
references to section 64 occur in the Journal.
They reveal only
an orderly passage of the section, which elicited no comment,
controversy or explanation. In the three North Dakota cases discussed above, 24 the court quoted, as have many other courts, a
statement by Judge Cooley, then sitting on the Michigan high
court, that "The mischief designed to be remedied was the enactment of amendatory statutes in terms so blind that legislators themselves were sometimes deceived in regard to their effect, and the
public, from the difficulty in making the necessary examination and
comparison, failed to become apprised of the changes made in
the laws."25 It must be remembered, however, that the Michigan
constitutional provision, while it is in style similar to section 64,
uses only the key words "revised, altered or amended" omitting
"extended" and "incorporated", which latter key letters are used
in section 64. And so we pass to a consideration of other-state
constitutional provisions similar to section 64.
AMERICAN LAW GENERALLY
In the absence of a constitutional mandate such as section 64,
legislation by reference is perfectly proper." a Thirty-six states have
21. See, e.g., Wilentz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 12 N.J. Misc. 531, 172 Atl. 903 (1934);
State v. Larson, 10 N.J. Misc. 384, 160 Atl. 556 (1932); State v. Armstrong, 31 N.M. 220,
243 Pac. 333 (1924); Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y. 290, 196 N.E. 61 (1935). But see,
Jersey City v. Martin, 127 N.J. Law 18, 20 A.2d 697 (1941), where the court held that
it is proper for the legislature to adopt by reference facts reasonably capable of acertainment and Texas Co. v. Dickinson, 79 N.J. Law 292, 75 Atl. 803 (1910), where the
court held that the laws of sister states are facts; Commonwealth v. Alderman, 275 Pa. 483,
119 At. 551 (1923) can be distinguished in that the court there felt that the 18th
Amendment required the states to adopt the interpretations of Congress.
22. Both published at Bismarck, N. D., by the Tribune (1889).
23. See pp. 83, 110, 141, 179, 225, and 280.
24. Other North Dakota decisions on section 64, not germane to this paper, are:
City of Fargo v. Sathre, 76 N.D. 341, 36 N.V.2d 39 (1949); Egbert v. City of Dunseith,
74 N.D. 1, 24 N.W.2d 907 (1946); Larkin v. Gronna, 69 N.D. 234, 285 N.W. 59 (1939);
Ford Motor Co. v. State, 59 N.D. 792, 231 N.W." 883 (1930).
25. People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 496 (1865).
26. See, e.g., Alton R.R. v.'United States, 315 U.S. 15 (1942); Hassett v. Welch,
303 U.S. 303 (1938); Alaska S.S. Co. v. Mullaney, 180 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1950)
(Rendered on Alaska territorial' income tax statute, see n. 5, supra.); Karsten v. United
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such a provision in one form or another. These provisions can be
classified into some five different types, North Dakota and Louisiana2 7 each having unique constitutions in this respect. (1) Twentyone states 28 use the following form:
"No act shall be revised or amended by mere refence to the
title, but the section as amended shall be set forth and published at full length."
with some variations. The key words used, besides "revised" and
"amended", are "revived ' , "altered", "repealed", or "reenacted".
The last two are rare. (2) Three states 29 use the above general
form with the key words "revised or amended or the provisions
thereof extended". (Emphasis added.) (3) Six states 30 use the
above general form with the key words "revived (or 'revised')
or amended or the provisions thereof extended or conferred". (Emphasis added.) (4) Two states, New Jersey and New York, have
provisions 3l that "No act . . . shall provide that any existing law
. . . shall be made or deemed a part of said act, or which shall enact
that any existing law . . . shall be applicable, except by inserting
it in such act." (5) Iowa 2 and Virginia 2 have provisions similar
to each other, that of Iowa reading:
"Every law which imposes, continues, or revises a tax, shall
distinctly state the tax, and the object to which it is to be applied; and it shall not be sufficient to refer to any other law
to fix such tax or object."
These constitutional declarations have generally been held to
merit a strict construction," especially where a literal interpretation
States, 161 F.2d 337 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 851 (1947); Legat v. Adorno,
138- Conn. 134, 83 A.2d 185 (1951); Pinkard v. Smith, 16 Ky. (Litt. Sel. Cas.) 331
(The Kentucky constitution dates from 1850.); Colins v. Blake, 79 Me. 218,
(1821)
9 Alt. 358 (1887); Commonwealth v. Kendall, 155 Mass. 357, 11 N.E. 425 (1887);
Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 540, 64 A.2d 322 (1949); Mettet v. Yankton, 71 S.D.
435, 25 N.W.2d 460 (1946); Town of Wauwatosa v. Milwaukee, 259 Wis. 56, 47
N.W.2d 442 (1951).
27. La Const. art. 3, §§ 17, 18.
28. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 14; Cal. Const. art. 4, § 24; Fla. Const. art. 3, § 16;
Ga. Const. art. 3, § 2-1916, par. 16; Idaho Const. art. 3, § 18; I1. Const. art. 4,1 § 13; Ind.
Const. art. 4 § 124; Kan. Const. art. 2, § 16; Md. Const. art. 3, § 29; Mich. Const. art.
5, § 21; Mis 3 . Const. art. 4, § 61; Mo. Const. art. 3, § 28; Neb. Const. art. 3, § 14;
Nev. Const. art. 4, § 17; Ohio Const. art. 2, § 16; Ore. Const. art. 4, § 22; Tenn. Const.
art. 2, § 17; 'Tex. Const. art. 3, § 36; Utah Const. art. 6, § 22; Wash. Const. art. 2, §
37; W. Va. Const. art. 6, § 30.
29. Mont. Const. art. 5, § 25; N. M. Const. art. 4, § 18; Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 26.
30. Ala. Const. art. 4, § 45; Ark. Const. art. 5, § 23; Colo. Const. art. 5, § 24; Ky.
Const. § 51; Okla. Const. art. 5, § 57; Pa. Const. art. 3, § 6.
31. N. J. 17onst. art. 4, § 7, para. 4; N. Y. Const. art. 3, § 16.
32. Iowa Const. art. 7, § 7.
33. Va. Ccnst. art. 4, §§ 50, 52.
34. See, e. g., Hermitage Spec. School Dist. v. Ingalls Spec. School Dist., 133 Ark. 157,
202 S.W. 26 (1918); Landis Township v. Division of Tax App., 137 N. J. Law 224, 59
A.2d 258 (1948); Jersey City v. Martin, 127 N. J. Law 18, 20 A.2d 697 (1941);
People v. Learned, 5 Hun 626 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 1875).
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would render many important acts invalid.3 5 Other courts have
indicated that a reasonable construction is to be applied. 36 However, these provisions are nonetheless mandatory and require
substantial compliance.3 - But just what is "substantial compliance"?
In the "revise or amend" jurisdictions, 3 the courts have found
nothing in their constitutions forbidding the extension or adoption
of prior statutes.39 It is well settled that under the more stringent
provisions, extension or adoption, by reference of matters of "procedureure", "remedy", or "enforcement" is proper 40 where the act in question is "complete within itself."41 There is less certainty as to validity
of extension or adoption, by reference, of substantive provisions.
Although section 64 has been referred to42 as similar to the
New York and New Jersey provisions, 43 it also seems closely akin
4
to the "revised, amended, extended, or conferred" provisions
of Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. Among these six states there is a split of authority as to
whether substantive law can ever be incorporated or extended by
reference, Colorado 45 answering "yes" and Alabama, 46 Arkan35. See, e.g., People ex eel. Everson v. Lorillard, 135 N. Y. 258, 31 N.E. 1011 (1892).
36. Scoles v. State, 47 Ark. 476, 1 S.W. 769 (1886); Board of Penitentiary Comm'rs
v. Spencer, 159 Ky. 255, 166 S.W. 1017 (1914); People ex eel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13
Mich. 481 (1865); Department of State Highways v. Baker, 69 N.D. 702, 290 N.W.
257 (1940).
37. Hazelrigg v. Hazelrigg, 169 Ky. 345, 183 S.W. 933 (1916); Board of.Penitentiary
Comm'rs v. Spencer, supra, note 36; Board of County Comm'rs v.-Oklahoma Tax Comm.,
202 Okla. 269, 212 P.2d 462 (1949).
38. See note 28, supra.
39. See, e. g., Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc., 32 Cal. 2d 53, 195 P.2d 1 (1948);
Hecht v. Shaw, 112 Fla. 762, 151 So. 333 (1933); Reme v. Edwards, 226 Ind. 229,
79 N.E.2d 389 (1948); Johnson v. Killion, 178 Kan. 154, 283 P.2d 433 (1955); Westervelt v. Yates, 145 Tex. 38, 194 S.W.2d 395 (1946).
40. See, e. g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 252 Ala. 199, 40 So.2d 330 (1949); White
v. Loughborough, 125 Ark. 57, 188 S.W. 10 (1916); Campbell v. Board of Pharmacy,
45 N.J. Law 241 (1883); Middle Rio Grande W. U. Ass'n v. Middle Rio Grande C. D.,
57 N.M. 287, 258 P.2d 391 (1953); Richfield Oil Corp. v. City of.Syracuse, 287 N. Y.
234, 39 N.E.2d 219 (1942); Service Feed Co. v. City of Ardmore, 171 Okla. 155, 42
P.2d 853 (1935).
41. This term needs defining. The courts seem to consider an act "complete within
itself" where, without the aid of another statute, it sets out a coherent rule of substantive
law. See Grable v. Blackwood, 180 Ark. 311, 22 S.W.2d 41 (1929); State v. McKinley,
120 Ark. 165, 179 S.W. 181 (1915); State v. McNeal, 49 N. J. Law 407, 5 Atl. 805
(1886).
In framing this rule, the courts have evolved the term "reference statute",
which seems to mean references valid under the rule. Winton v. Bartlett, 181 Ark. 669,
27 S.W.2d 100 (1930); House v. Road Improvement Dist. No. 4, 154 Ark. 218, 242
S.W. 68 (1922); Board of County Comm'rs ;,. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 202 Okla. 269,
212 P.2d 462 (1949). See Bloxton v. State Highway Comm., 225 Ky. 324, 8 S.W.2d
392 (1928).
42. State v. Armstrong, 31 N. M. 220, 243 Pac. 333 (1025).
43. See note 31, supra.
44. See note 30, supra. See also the "revise,- amend, or extend" provisions of Montana,
New Mexico, and Wyoming, note 29, supra.
45. See Armstrong v. Johnson Storage & Moving Co., 84 Co!o. 142, 268 Pac. 978
(1928); Denver Circle By. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac. 714 (1887). Contra, Pcople
v. Friederich, 67 Colo. 6e, 185 Pac. 657 (1919).
46. See Street v. Hooten, 131 Ala. 492, 32 So. 580 (1902); Stewart v. County of
Hale, 82 Ala. 209, 2 So. 270 (1887).
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sas,4" and Kentucky' s answering "no". The Pennsylvania decisions
are in conflict.19 The question has not been squarely answered in
Oklahoma, but there is dictum implying that the courts would not
accept a reference to substantive law.50 New Jersey5" and New
York 52 both seem to have decided that reference to substantive law
is prohibited by their constitutions. In New Mexico, a "revive,
amend, or extend" state, the supreme court has held invalid as a
prohibited extension an attempt to adopt provisions of the National
Prohibition Act by mere reference. 3 In the same state, the attorney
general has decided that a proposed statute allowing certain persons to pay a percentage of the federal income tax, with adjustments, in lieu of the regular state income tax, would violate the
New Mexico counterpart of section 64.1'
Occasionally, courts have been faced with fairly close questions
as to whether the statute in question actually does incorporate the
provisions of another statute. They have not been quick to find the
contended-for incorporation in these situations. 5
As we have seen, the North Dakota Baker case is some authority
for the proposition that it is proper to incorporate definitibns by
reference. There is little other authority on the question in the
states with provisions similar to North Dakota's."
47. Farris v. Wright, 158 Ark. 519, 250 S.W. 889 (1923); Rider v. State, 132 Ark.
27, 200 S.W. 275 (1918); Beard v. Wilson, 52 Ark. 290, 12 S.W. 567 (1889); Watkins
v. City of Eureka Springs, 49 Ark. 131, 4 S.W. 384 (1887).
48. Board of Penitentiary Comm'rs v. Spencer, 159 Ky. 255, 166 S.W. 1017 (1914)
(dictum).
49. See in re Guenrhoer's Estate, 235 Pa. 67, 83 Atl. 617 (1912).
Contra, Titusville
Iron-Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. St. 627, 15 Atl. 917 (1888).
50. City of.Pound Creek v. Haskell, 21 Okla. 711, 97 Pa'. 338 (1908).
51. See Jersey City v. Martin, 127 N. J. Law 18, 20 A.2d 697 (1941); Wilentz v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 12 N.J. Misc. 5.31, 172 Atl. 903 (1934); State v. Larson, 10
N. J. Misc. 384, 160 Atl. 556 (1932).
Contra, Texas Co. v. Dickinson, 79 N..J. Law
292, 75 Atl. 803 (1910).
But see, State v. Hotel Bar Foods, 18 N. J. 115, 112 A.2d
726 (1955).
52. See Becker v. Eisner, 277 N. Y. 143, 13 N.E.2d 747 (1938); Darweger v. Staats,
267 N. Y. 290, 196 N.E. 61 (1935).
Contra, Curtin v. Barton, 139 N. Y. 505, 34 N.E.
1093 (1893)
53. State v. Armstrong, 31 N. M. 220, 243 Pac. 333 (1924).
54-. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 5645 (1953-54).
55. See, e.g., Watkinson v. Hotel Pennsylvania, 195 App. Div. 624, 187 N. Y. Supp.
278 (3d Dep't), aff'd mene., 231 N. Y. 562, 132 N.E. 889 (1921); People ex rel. Weaver
v¢. Van De Carr, 150 N. Y. 439, 44 N.E. 1040 (1896); Commonwealth v. Warner Bros.
Theatres, Inc., 345 Pa. 270, 27 A.2d 62 (1942). The Arkansas Supreme Court, in House v.
Road Improvement Dist. No. 4, 154 Ark. 218, 242 S.W. 68 (1922), stated that "reference statutes" (used in the special sense) -do not incorporate into themselves the statutes
referred to.
56. In Colorado, a statute reading in part, ". . . any law of this state defining delinquency or, concerning contributory delinquency shall . . . be held to include all girls
under the age of eightden (18) years." was held invalid as a prohibited extension by
reference. People v. Friederich, 67 Colo. 69, 185 Pac. 657 (1919).
A line of Oklahoma
cases has held that a reference to a prior section of the act in question for a definition
of the word "highway" is proper.
See, e.g., State v. Sheldon, 96 Okla. Crim. 38, 247
P.2d 975 (1952); Ex parte McMahan, 94 Okla. Crim. 419, 237 P.2d 462 (1951).
Iowa, after whose income tax statute Senate Bill 186 was patterned, has held that a
reference to federal law for the definition of "moneyed capital" in a corporate franchise
tax statute was proper, after holding that the reference v-as for a defini'ton only and not
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In addition to applying the foregoing tests, i.e., whether the act
in question is "complete in itself', whether the reference is to
"procedure", "remedy", "enforcement" or "definition", and whether
an "incorporation" has actually been worked, the courts have resorted to another standard less mechanical and conceptualistic.
Here the issue is whether the act under consideration is in conformity with the basic policy of the framers of the constitutional
mandate concerned.5 7 The standard statement of the "mischief
designed to be remedied" was made by Judge Cooley and is
quoted supra.55 This test is not, however, independent of the others
used by the courts. For instance, all but one5" of the cases cited in
support of the "mischief" rule involved the fundamental facts necessary for the application of one or another of the "mechanical"
rules. In most, the court expressly made the rules supplementary
to each other.
CONCLUSION
The authorities dictate that section 64 be construed to include
references to any legislation, not merely references to North Dakota statutes. This leaves the court with a choice of basic approaches to section 64, i.e., either the "mechanical" or the "mischief'
approach. If the court chooses the former, the question arises
whether Senate Bill 186 works an incorporation of the IRC. It
is apparent that it does. The cases close to the point which have
found no incorporation arrive at that conclusion either because
procedural provisions were adopted 0 or because the court differentiated between a franchise tax and an income tax. 61 It might
be said that the Baker case supports the constitutionality of Senate
Bill 186 in that it held valid a definition by reference. But it should
be noted that the definitions there referred to did not affect the
computation of the tax, as do the definitions of "net income", "taxable income" and "deductions" in Senate Bill 186. In the cases
where definitions by reference were upheld, the definitions were
for the purpose of fixing the tax. Ballard-Hassett Co. v. Local Bd. of Review, 215 Iowa
556, 246 N.W. 277 (1933).
57. See, e.g., Bay Shell Road Co. v. O'Donnell, 87 Ala. 376, 6 So. 119 (1889);
Grable v. Blackwood, 180 Ark. 311, 22 S.W.2d 41 (1929); Lyman v. Ramey, 195 Ky.
L. Rep. 223, 242 S.W. 21 (1922); Edmonds v. Haskell, 121 Okla. 18, 247 Pac. 15
(1926); State v. McNeal, 48 N. J. Law 407, 5 Atl. 805 (1886); Becker v. Eisner, 277
N. Y. 143, 13 N.E.2d 747 (1938).
58. Speaking of the Arkansas constitution in the leading case Watkins v. City of Eureka
Springs, 49 Ark. 131, 4 S.W. 384, 385 (1887), the court said, "They [the framers of
the constitution] meant only to lay a restraint upon legislation where the bill was presented in such form that the legislator could not determine what its provisions were Yrom
an inspection of it.
What is not within the mischief is not within the inhibition."
See
also, People ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Banks, 67 N. Y. 568, 575 (1876).
59. Lyman v. Ramey, 195 Ky. L. Rep. 223, 242 S.W. 21 (1922).
60. House v. Road Improvement Dist. No. 4, 154 Ark. 218, 242 S.W. 68 (1922).

61. Commonwealth v. Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc., 345 Pa. 270, 27 A.2d 62 (1942).
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peripheral to the purpose of the statute. In contrast, the definitions
adopted in Senate Bill 186 are its heart and substance, its whole
purpose. Further, the provisions in section 7 of the bill for the
splitting of the federal tax deduction by couples filing separately
"according to law" is not a definition. In the light of these facts,
it would seem that the Baker case might be distinguished.
Finally, the court has not yet decided whether section 64 allows
an adoption of substantive law by reference. The determination of
what is substantive and what is procedural is often difficult, but in
the case of section 64 there seems little room for argument. The
federal law adopted is not concerned with the mechanics of the
collection of the tax, the remedy of the state or the enforcement of
the levy. It is concerned with the determination of the tax due.
In the Baker case the fact that the statute in question itself fixed
the tax was one of the circumstances emphasized by the court in
upholding that statute. In determining whether section 64 allows
reference to substantive law, the court is faced with a clear majority of decisions which denounce such a reference in the states
whose constitutional provisions most closely parallel North Dakota's.
If the court chooses to use the "mischief' approach, there
arises the question whether a legislator could tell from the face
of Senate Bill 186 just what provisions he was enacting into law.
Rather obviously, he could not. On the other hand, it is equally
obvious that the legislator knew that it was the federal law that
was being made North Dakota's. Is this enough under the "mischief" rule?62 If and when the Supreme Court of North Dakota
passes on the questions, we shall know.
PEDAR C. WOLD

62. See Watkins v. City of Eureka Springs, 49 Ark. 131, 4 S.W. 384 (1887).

